Husserl was perhaps the most interesting of the Continental philosophers in that he was only quasi-Continental in his outlook.

Unfortunately, as with basically every other philosopher who has tried to conclude something non-trivial from self-reflections on consciousness, most of his insights are based on things that at best are unproven and at worst now mostly proved false. For instance, the centrally important idea of noema (notwithstanding disagreements about what exactly Husserl meant by it) doesn't seem to have any particular neural correlate, and indeed, that it even exists as part of intentionality is suspect given that intentionality itself as understood by philosophers of the time is now suspect given various sorts of psychological tests (e.g. where you explicitly trick people into accepting as intentional something that you explicitly introduced randomly).

In essence, phenomenology is a failed endeavor because introspection provides little way to generate testable hypotheses, leaving development as an increasingly unstable tower of assumptions and assertions; and because the actual functioning of our minds is highly non-obvious, as psychophysics continually delights in showing us. So--good try! But, alas, for the most part Husserl has been defeated by objective reality: it doesn't, at this point, seem to have been such that phenomenology was a particularly fruitful avenue of inquiry (beyond some of the most basic take-home messages that, for instance, caution the logical positivists that they can't be so sure of their project).

In terms of advancement of our understanding of how to separate our individual experience from objective reality, like many others, he fails to really deliver much guidance. Although he may have more keenly grasped the problem than, say, Popper, the tradition of the philosophy of science developed by Popper, Kuhn, Quine, etc. have done far more to help shield us from the practical drawbacks of having a necessarily subjective view of what we believe to be an objective reality.

Trying to build lasting knowledge or insight on things as poorly understood as consciousness and intent (given the immense biases in our perception of our consciousness) makes about as much sense as constructing a building with a foundation of smoke. It just doesn't work, and Husserl could perhaps have noticed if he had been a little more thoroughly self-referential, or mindful of evolution. While highly accurate sense perceptions are critical to survival, a great deal of confusion about what our internal mental states are, how they develop, and so on, is presumably tolerable. So, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should judge that we likely to have the cognitive nature for naive realism to work pretty well, and that anything else is dubious.

So, anyway, while I agree that he was an important historical figure in philosophy, and am impressed with some aspects of his insightfulness, at this point it seems an almost wholly unproductive tangent to me. The conundrums and cautions you describe are almost wholly covered by thought from long before Husserl--Hume, for instance, covers the same ground plenty well enough, albeit with quite different conclusions.

Yes, we have different perspectives and biases, but experimentation and rational argumentation help minimize how confused these make us, and beyond that, we just need to realize that "lived experience" isn't necessarily real beyond our heads; usually it is fairly real-ish, though, and if it's not, it's time to call a psychiatrist for help.