I still don't see the connection between Popper and any part of Critical Theory save the name. The CRT literature I've read is, even when well-argued, largely absent attempts at falsification. I understand Popper's contribution to the philosophy of science (and some of its limitations)--but it doesn't seem connected.

Even Horkheimer was hardly talking about philosophy of science but rather more about the what-he-viewed-as-rational purpose and limitations-based-on-social-assumptions of the philosopher-scientist, and anyway, CRT and Critical Theory as they developed held more and more with Continental/postmodern-style ideas and drifted ever further from the more obviously evidence-embracing logical positivism, falsification/critical rationality, scientific realism, and so on.

I haven't read everything; this isn't my area of expertise (just moderate interest), but it has never struck me that Popper was particularly supportive of, or appreciated by, the Critical Theory side of things, nor that Critical Whatever was particularly falsificationist for any Whatever that is or derives from Critical Theory--in principle they could be, but in practice they tend to focus on subjectivity and intersubjectivity so much that they don't have much time left for hard-nosed empiricism. (I've wanted to track down Popper's debate with Adorno, but haven't managed yet.) Indeed, the Legal Realists were very much in a Popperian (analytically evidential) vein, and Critical Legal Studies--inspired by Critical Theory--were mostly in opposition.