I think you'd better show some really good argument here since this is kind of at odds with a great deal of Western philosophy, including that which is the justification of racism as evil.

Unless you mean everyone is free to be "prejudiced" against anyone else as long as it's morally and epistemically justified. That is: prejudice is fine, but bigotry is not. As long as we're clear that this is how we're using the words--and I note that prejudice does contain a negative connotation that is inappropriate if this is the meaning--then it's fine.

There's no problem as long as we apply a uniform standard to everyone. For instance, suppose we pick a particular level of prejudice as warranted.

And suppose this level, as applied to Medium articles, means that when you read a statement from a black person saying something like, "I hate white cops", you go, yeah, okay--given how white cops on average harass black people, it's reasonable for a black person to both treat them as hostile (because statistically they're more likely to be). It's prejudice, but we decide that this level of prejudice is sufficiently justified to be okay.

But then when you read Medium articles saying, "There's so much everyday racism--like just this evening this white woman crossed to the other side of the street when we were walking towards each other," you go, no, actually, given the statistics of cross-racial violence, that may well be equally justified.

If you are instead arguing for a disparity, then you have some serious work to do to justify it.

-------

I also think the argument with the definition of racism is a bit naive as you present it (and I hold you to a somewhat different standard because you're a philosopher). "Racist" has not just a literal meaning but also a connotation. When you redefine the word, you keep the old connotation. But the old connotation isn't necessarily justified. Indeed, much of the motive to redefine a word may be to get to apply an invalid connotation as part of fallacious reasoning. That this is implicit and difficult to detect makes it no less fallacious.

For instance, if you redefine "violence", whose powerful negative connotations are justified by the serious injury and death provoked by un-redefined violence, to include things like being carded at age 35 when someone else stopped being carded at 30, anything you say is importing the powerful connotations of panic, injury, and death that surround being thrown to the ground and repeatedly kicked.

Eventually, people adapt. "Violence" loses its emotional affect because everyone understands that it includes an off-handed unkind remark.

But in the meantime, I am skeptical of redefinitions. They seem mostly a way to engage in fallacious reasoning. "Involuntary servitude" unjustly escapes the appropriate connotations that are evoked by "slavery". It's long been a tool of those who wish to escape responsibility for doing evil ("extraordinary rendition", "enhanced interrogation techniques", etc.). But to try to use fallacy for good is, I would argue, both wrong and foolish. It is foolish because it is difficult to make good decisions when your reasoning is based on fallacy and it is hard to gather long-term support when you are misleading people (even unwittingly). It is wrong because self-interest leads people to mis-estimate utilitarian outcomes and therefore except in truly extraordinary situations should follow rule-based ethnics (because in practice this produces better utility)--and the rule of being honest is being violated (though perhaps only in a small way).

Now, I don't want to say that language should never change. It should, and some of these changes may be appropriate. But especially as a philosopher, I think it is important to recognize the complex interplay of literal meaning and connotation, the lag between declarative redefinition and actual adjustment of cognitive patterns, and the potential for miscommunication and fallacious reasoning during the adjustment period.