Mental representations of phenomena, or noumena, necessarily leave out a lot: indeed, we (tautologically) can only think about portions that fit in our mind (and it can be instructive to think about what fits and what doesn't in various different contexts). This part is pretty clear.
What isn't clearly true is the implication associated with the purpose you ascribe to it. There isn't even a point in having a brain if one isn't going to use it to guide one's behavior, and behavior is used to select from the possible outcomes that might entail, so in a trivial sense, yes, our brains are there to allow us to "dominate" nature. Everything living attempts to dominate nature in this way using its biochemical or neural computational capacity.
The deer objectifies nature, carving it up into "wolves" and various other things, in order to dominate nature by avoiding getting eaten by wolves. That we have happened to find some really good methods doesn't change that we're all playing the same game (or that if you distinguish between the harmonious and destructive flavors of the game, that objective understanding necessarily abets the destructive flavor alone).
Anyway, I'm perfectly fine with a neo-Kantian take. That isn't what I was objecting to.
What I was objecting to was ideas like "our everyday notion of “objective truth” is a pretense: we pretend we’re being neutral in recording facts which are given to us" when that isn't our notion of objective truth at all, at least not for anyone I've ever talked to. It conflates personal motivation (e..g "I love tennis!") with objectivity (e.g. "Serena Williams won 23 singles major titles") as if the motivation leeches into the objectivity. Well, of course it can via bias and such, but not like this. When you say, "we introduce subjectivity into our objective thoughts and statements, making them intersubjective, at best, [...] by using our knowledge to achieve our goals" this is just flat-out wrong, and I think you even admit as much now: "I don't say goals change the facts." If the goals aren't changing "the facts"--our apprehension of the truth value of some statement--in what sense have we introduced any subjectivity into our objective thoughts? The objective thoughts are still totally objective, and we never claimed (did we?!) that our choice of which thoughts to explore was fully objective.
If we did claim that, for some definition of we, we are quite silly indeed (I would like to know who "we" are!), and could be disabused of this notion in a sentence or two.
Regarding Superman on Krypton, you seem to place a type of inverse relationship at the wrong place. There is a type of inverse relationship: when we try to understand something nonfictional, we generally try to take the full complexity that's out there to build a simplified model that we can work from. However, when we are creating fiction, we generally start from an even-more-simplified core idea and generatively create more complexity until we are satisifed with how elaborate our model is.
Understanding nonfiction is model-fitting; creating fiction is running a generative model; and these are in a sense inverses.
By the time you get to the point where you're talking about "Superman is from Krypton", however, what makes the statement effectively objective is the type of evidence that counts. Except for very very simple fiction, we still have to make our own more compact model than everything that the author developed during their generative process. And except for when we're discovering the processes ourselves, when we read nonfiction we still are creating our own somewhat-simplified model based on someone else's model. If you read in a nonfiction book that "Calcutta is the capital of Turkey", it is objectively true that this book declares that Calcutta is the capital of Turkey. But it is only objectively true in the real world if, in fact, it is so (c.f. "snow is white"). The difference with fiction is that if it is objectively true that the appropriate work of fiction declares that "Birin Zana is the capital of Wakanda", then we don't need to go check the actual world. We're done.
And it's the same process, not an inverse process. It's just abbreviated: we can skip the last step.
That Superman is from Krypton is only intersubjective inasmuch as language itself is intersubjective. Once you agree linguistically to use the same terms for all models, whether or not you hoped they reflected reality, then you're kind of stuck concluding that Superman is from Krypton.
(Note: I can never convince myself that I have understood Husserl well enough to know what "intersubjective" is supposed to mean. I am not sure why you used it in talking about Superman--it seems like you're using the term not precisely with Husserl's meaning but with a more colloquial sense of "agreed social convention" which is distinguished from pure objectivity. My sense has always been that Husserl used it to mean something more foundational and thereby more challenging to the very notion of objectivity itself.)
Finally, I'm not sure why you say my condescension is no substitute for a good argument--it wasn't a substitute, as I gave arguments. My tone was a bit too grumpy, admittedly. But the arguments were all there, save for the blue sky topic, where I simply made a statement of what I viewed as the nature of the problem but didn't support it at all. Given that you already characterized my arguments as "rabbit holes", I offer that in this instance I perhaps made the right choice.