Nice summaries, except I think you make Peirce sound way more of a relativist than he actually was. My impression of Peirce is that he believes fully in an objective reality and that the only kind of utility that counts is the utility in making predictions about that objective reality. Anything other kind of utility (emotional comfort, economic gain, social standing, etc.) is strictly out of bounds. Doesn't Peirce think that everyone, regardless of starting point, will converge upon the same truth, given sufficient effort and sound scientific methods? However, practically, we label as "true" those things which we've tested out well enough, and pragmatically we put effort into the areas that will help us (so we get "closer to truth" in some sense), not into those that don't.

Your description makes Peirce sound too relativistic, I think.

The tricky part about pragmatism is that you absolutely have to preserve the scientific method, because pragmatically, that outstrips every other method humans have for doing anything.

Your descriptions don't make clear how the pragmatists attempted to do that, though the ones I'm familiar with pretty much did. I'm not at all sure Rorty succeeded, though I believe he thought he did (despite trying to distance science and philosophy, as you mentioned).