Stop saying it and show it already!

Where is that declared?

If the physical has primacy it doesn't mean that there are no qualia, it just means that qualia are physically implemented.

You linked to things that agree with the (longer) SEP definition, and which don't exclude qualia as existing, physically implemented.

The only possible implementation is not panpsychism, where water molecules feel stuff. A water molecule is not an arithmetic logic unit. This doesn't mean that materialism denies multiplication. It just means that if you want to do multiplication with matter, you need more than a molecule.

Having an "internal world" is, if it is a computation, a far more complex computation than a simple multiplier in an ALU.

But if you can show something that is much simpler than an ALU, far too simple to compute internal worlds and goals and all that stuff, and yet show that it clearly experiences qualities, then you'd have a stout counterargument against materialism.

Because qualities are not fundamental but a derived process of computation implemented materially, materialism would be disproved by showing that the computational capacity is insufficient.

You can't, however, get anywhere by saying "no qualities!" over and over again. Or by saying "metaphysically distinct!" You have to show why. You can link to any argument you please, but the idealist philosophers' best attempts seem to boil down to, "In this case which is necessarily highly non-intuitive, my intuition says it wouldn't work."

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When you say, "Solipsism states that all there are are the contents of my own personal mind," no, you don't know what solipsism is. Please read something like https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/ and get back to me when you can at least get the definition straight.

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Regarding Hoffman, you were using his results to make a point, so I'm not doing anything but demonstrating that his results don't hold broadly enough to make that point. From https://sites.socsci.uci.edu/~ddhoff/PerceptualEvolution.pdf, they admit "For the environments and perceptual strategies used in our simulations, we find that naive realist and critical realist strategies go extinct except for certain cases in which the costs for perceptual information are small (as the figures in the previous section illustrate). This finding might reflect a general and important feature of perceptual evolution, or it might be an artifact of our particular simulations. [...] For instance, in our simulations the environment is probabilistically invariant over time, but in nature the environment is constantly in flux."

Emphasis mine. (Also, note the high "cost per bit" used throughout.) Their own results show that if gathering information is cheap, you want true information (e.g. Figure 14A). So the game is: make truth cheap, and you win. Truth also wins if reality is important but complicated.

When you think about it from the perspective of decision theory, it's actually not a very surprising result. If things are highly stable, you can use an extremely slow computational process (evolution) to find decision boundaries. As long as it's cheaper to compute only where you are compared to these boundaries than to try to find determine what constitutes a boundary de novo (which would be unsurprising--see compressed sensing, for instance), then you win.

If things are not highly stable, so you can't count on the placement of the decision boundary, then you have to find it live or do poorly.

Decision theory is all about the exploration/exploitation tradeoff. Hoffman's correctly pushed that all the way back into evolution in the case of extremely stable systems, and then made piles of wildly unsupportable generalizations on the basis of it.

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Glad we agree that Whateverism is the simpler model. As you say, "The World just is the way that it is."

Except, oddly, materialism seems to be able to tell us why almost everything is (even going so far as to explain to us the nature of the randomness for those things that are effectively random).

So, whateverism is easy, but materialism is effective. Idealism is harder than whateverism, but no more effective for questions like these.