That is an interesting question--whether it happens at all and if so what the differences in nature of experience and cognition are like--but why do we need to resort to comparisons to squirrels? I've never been a squirrel. The problem of other minds is especially vexing when it comes to squirrels.

You and I both have more exposure to philosophy than a typical human. Do we find what others take for granted preposterous and infantile based on our higher mode of thinking? You have more exposure to philosophy than I do. Do you view as preposterous or infantile my assumptions?

And yet!--I'm pretty sure I have more training in neuroscience than you do. Should I view your thoughts on cognition and biology as preposterous and infantile?

In some circumstances, I suppose I might: if you say something particularly silly. But mostly not, not because our immediate experience is enough but because it is where we all start from, and because aspects of it are incredibly reliable.

Although I of course have no proof of this, I am reminded of Turing-completeness in this regard. Practically every computational system of nontrivial extent is, when taken to its limit, equivalent to every other. It might be horribly inefficient, and in practice the physical capacity of some device might be exceeded, but everything is in some sense the same computationally. This result makes me very wary of concluding that "transhumans" or advanced aliens or futuristic AI or whatnot will have anything much to say about object permanence or the melting point of pure tungsten in a vacuum. Things like that I think we've nailed already, and to the extent that there's more to know it's not that we're not being objective, it's that the reasons why we see the (objectively verifiable) patterns that we do could be understood with more profundity.