The reason I don't mention Kant is because I view him as essentially irrelevant when it comes to why philosophers can be unreasonable bad at science.

His transcendental epistemology was fine as far as it went; in trying to unify the empiricist and rationalist views, he produced a variety of really interesting ideas, some of which are pretty okay (better than what anyone else was saying at the time) and some of which are hilariously wrong given what we know about modern neuroscience. For the time, anyway, it certainly wasn't denying the effectiveness of science. But neither did it produce a resolution that was satisfying to everyone thereafter (even if they did all have to engage with his ideas), and it mostly wasn't following on from him that produced a clearer understanding of how to do science (or how not to say dumb things about science as a philosopher).

For example, as far as I recall anyway, Popper, for instance, doesn't really rely on Kant in any noticeable way when developing his ideas of falsification. Even if Kant solved one aspect of the problem of induction so you can at least try to get off the ground (by noting that if people start with some capacities, not nothing, then there's something to work with), aside from permitting Popper to work on his project, I don't think it was central. Certainly Kant's idealism didn't help anyone with anything on the scientific side--but neither did it harm anything, because you can safely ignore it.

Anyway, I wasn't writing a critique of all aspects of philosophy, just that part that gets its epistemology so wrong that it cannot account for the unreasonable success of science. A lot of it, after very much digging and deep thinking and careful textual analysis, is precisely as illuminating as the following is good cooking advice: "well, ovens and stoves can burn things and burned food isn't good, so have a raw potato for breakfast".

"We're not sure why this works" is fine. "We're sure that the reason it works isn't because so-and-so" is fine. But "nope, science doesn't work" is not fine because it obviously does, and "science is one of many things that works" is also not fine because everything else obviously doesn't to anywhere the same degree.

So far, philosophy has exactly zero successes at finding "some whole other thing" regarding the nature of the universe, so I wouldn't hold my breath. It's fine to explore, but let's be honest about what is or isn't found.