Unfortunately, I have read Popper. And Kuhn, and Feyerabend. And about Russel, if not much of him. And I've read Chalmers and Dennett and Quine and both Churchlands and...that doesn't matter because I'm not questioning all of philosophy, and it also doesn't matter because unless I'm actually referencing paradigm shifts or something, the merits of my argument are contained within my argument, not inferred from whose works I might or might not have read.

Anyway, I am indeed questioning that philosophers who favor panpsychism are the correct type of experts when you want experts on the fundamental nature of reality.

Physicists generally don't need to do metaphysics (and when they do it as an ad-hoc endeavor, they generally do it badly--so they should either bite the bullet and learn what they're talking about, or stick more strictly to the "shut up and calculate" approach), but they do study observable properties of reality at the most fundamental levels.

This means that when Cartesian dualists or panpsychics or deists or whomever else starts sounding like their metaphysical claims might have any consequences whatsoever for the fundamental properties of reality, physicists are in-bounds as domain experts.

And it also means that Reinhardt is correct to challenge Murphy on whether philosophers need to know physics. It's not always necessary, but if you're going to start making any metaphysical claims that have material consequences, the consequences are probably going to manifest as physics.

Panpsychism can escape Hossenfelder's charge of states of awareness being missing if it restricts itself to being completely epiphenomenal. But that runs into problems with evidence from cognitive science: consciousness does look causal, not merely epiphenomenal, and panpsychism doesn't have much point if it's not even going to help explain consciousness.

Either way, this metaphysics needs to engage with at least one of two robustly-developed sciences.