What defines bigotry most clearly is not anything that you said but rather unjustified contempt. Whether a belief is justified or not does not depend on its truth-value, but rather what one knows about its truth value. Thus, bigotry is not merely a matter of being mistaken, but if one is mistaken, holding the mistaken beliefs in an unjustifiable way (e.g. by being willfully ignorant, by believing low-reliability evidence over high-reliability evidence, and so on). Furthermore, contempt is necessary but must be unjustifiable, either because the bigot is correct in their factual beliefs but responds with a wholly disproportionate level of contempt; or because the bigot has unjustifiable beliefs that if true would warrant the level of contempt but which would not survive any reasonably impartial survey of evidence which is reasonably accessible.

I think this view also leaves Uygur and Kasparian in the clear, from what I understand (which is not very much: I don't follow TYT closely at all). But I think your analysis misses the key features of bigotry that separate it from other types of opinion.