Yes, because the fine structure constant turns out to seem to be highly fundamental. (I'm with Pauli on this one.) The universe really, really likes the relationship between the speed of light, the vacuum permittivity, etc., to be exactly just-so. If you have something more fundamental, maybe you can explain the fundamental things like that. But no, you only provide handwaving.

We agree that there is much more for materialism to do than for idealism to do--I view that as a feature, not a bug; it's a far more stringent hypothesis (and I'm fine with bailing on it, too, if it really doesn't fit something, but so far it either fits or the jury is out in that we know that we couldn't possibly know enough to be confident it can't fit).

We both start from experience--that doesn't require a miracle beyond the "miracle" of existing and having experience; how could we do anything else?--but you seemingly get ontology and epistemology confused. I just keep going, "And how do I explain the most that I can while assuming as little as possible?"

You don't explain how you reject solipsism, but I (tentatively) reject solipsism and (tentatively) embrace materialism for the same reason: they're parsimonious explanations.

Regarding materialism's stance on qualia, I refer you to the SEP's article: https://plato.stanford.edu/Archives/Win2004/entries/physicalism/. tl;dr is that materialism is fine with qualia as long as they're implemented physically.